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Both perceptual load theory and dilution theory purport to explain when and why
task-irrelevant information, or so-called distractors are processed. Central to both
explanations is the notion of limited resources, although the theories differ in the precise
way in which those limitations affect distractor processing. We have recently proposed
a neurally plausible explanation of limited resources in which neural competition among
stimuli hinders their representation in the brain. This view of limited capacity can also
explain distractor processing, whereby the competitive interactions and bias imposed to
resolve the competition determine the extent to which a distractor is processed. This
idea is compatible with aspects of both perceptual load and dilution models of distractor
processing, but also serves to highlight their differences. Here we review the evidence
in favor of a biased competition view of limited resources and relate these ideas to both
classic perceptual load theory and dilution theory.
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INTRODUCTION
“Everyone knows what attention is . . . it implies withdrawal from
some things in order to deal effectively with others” (James, 1890).
For over a century, psychologists have understood that the pri-
mary problem with attention is that we do not have enough of
it; we simply cannot process and respond to all the informa-
tion in the environment that may be relevant to our current
task (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Cherry, 1953; Welford, 1957; Broadbent,
1958; Sperling, 1960; Eriksen and St. James, 1986; Pylyshyn and
Storm, 1988; Raymond et al., 1992; Pashler, 1994); nor can we
completely inhibit distracting information (e.g., Stroop, 1935;
Treisman, 1960; Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). More recent research
has sought to understand the neural basis of our limited atten-
tional capacity, and has revealed neural limits in our capacity
to prioritize (e.g., Mecklinger et al., 2003), encode into working
memory (e.g., Todd and Marois, 2004; Scalf et al., 2007, 2011b),
and respond to task-relevant material (e.g., dual task interference
Dux et al., 2006; Erickson et al., 2007).
The prevailing model and thus investigations of our limited
capacity to attend to multiple items have focused on our lim-
ited attentional resources (e.g., Intriligator and Cavanagh, 2001;
Lavie and Robertson, 2001; Mitchell and Cusack, 2008; Xu and
Chun, 2009). These models have suggested that it is our limited
ability to simultaneously direct attention to multiple stimuli that
causes our limited capacity to respond to those items. They pro-
ceed from a “resource-limited” view of attentional capacity (e.g.,
Alvarez and Franconeri, 2007); that is, because we can select, indi-
viduate and identify any single member of a group of items, our
failure to successfully perform these operations simultaneously
on all members must derive from the limited resources we have
to apply to them. The notion that our limited attentional capac-
ity is caused by limited attentional resources has both implicitly
and explicitly informed research for well over a century, effec-
tively constraining questions about attentional function to those
concerned with the “resources” that direct attention.
COMPETITION FOR REPRESENTATION INSTEAD OF LIMITED
RESOURCES
Exactly what is an “attentional resource”? One definition has
been “regulatory juice” (Mozer and Sitton, 1998) but exchang-
ing the word “juice” for “resource” is not particularly helpful.
Some models of “resources” compare them to a power supply
(Kahneman, 1973), such as the amount of gas available to a cook-
ing range. But what would the neural equivalent of “gas” be?
Although severe glucose restriction (Ståhle et al., 2011) or oxy-
gen depletion (such as at high altitude; Kramer et al., 1993) can
indeed impair cognitive function, low-levels of neither of these
metabolites appear to be responsible for the attentional limita-
tions experienced by well-nourished individuals at sea-level. Nor
is it the case that attentional limitations are caused by a num-
ber of neurons insufficient to represent task-relevant material
and cognitive functions. Historically, resources have been some-
times referred to as occurring in “pools”; that is the extent to
which these “pools” are available determines the extent to which
they may be simultaneously applied to different stimuli or tasks
(Wickens, 1984; Wickens et al., 1984). Such theories attempt to
separate the “pools” by processing modality, positing that sep-
arable sensory (visual, auditory) or cognitive (verbal, spatial)
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operations will not limit each other because they rely on differ-
ent regions of neural tissue. At first glance, this may appear to be
a sensible heuristic for defining a resource. But consider the vast
amount of neural tissue dedicated to processing of visual stimuli;
not only are the full visual fields represented many times over, at
many spatial scales, but regions broadly specialized for processing
certain classes of stimuli (e.g., faces, places, objects) share rela-
tively little neural overlap (Malach et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al.,
1997; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998). And yet, it is still very dif-
ficult for us to simultaneously attend to one house and one face
(Reddy et al., 2009). What then is the neural basis of this limited
processing capacity?
Critically, neither individual neurons nor neural populations
operate in isolation. Instead, they have continuous, mutually
modulatory interactions; the response of two individual neurons
with different receptive fields (RF) that are filled with different
stimuli may each be modified by the stimuli outside of their own
RF as a result of the neurons’ inhibitory or excitatory interac-
tions (e.g., Blakemore and Tobin, 1972; DeAngelis et al., 1992;
Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Pelli, 2008). The ability of neu-
ral interactions to dramatically influence visual perception has
been well-articulated by models of competition for representa-
tion (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) and divisive normalization
(Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Specifically, although adjacent
visual information may simultaneously fall within the RF of adja-
cent, but separate cell populations early in visual processing (e.g.,
V1), the output of the high resolution cells will ultimately con-
verge on a single population of cells at higher level of visual
cortex (Gattass et al., 1988), at which point they will interact in a
mutually inhibitory manner. For example, two stimuli presented
simultaneously within the same RF of a V4 cell evoke less activity
than the summed activity of each individual stimulus presented
alone (Chelazzi et al., 1998; Reynolds et al., 1999). Similarly, four
neighboring stimuli presented simultaneously, and thus capa-
ble of competing with each other through mutually inhibitory
interactions, evoke lower blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
responses in V4 than the same stimuli presented sequentially and
thus unable to compete (Kastner et al., 1998, 2001; Beck and
Kastner, 2005, 2007). Moreover, the magnitude of this difference,
which can be viewed as an index of competition, varies as a func-
tion of the distance among the stimuli (Kastner et al., 2001) and
scales with RF size across visual cortex (Kastner et al., 1998, 2001;
Beck and Kastner, 2005, 2007) suggesting that inhibitory interac-
tions among multiple stimuli are strongest when they are likely to
fall simultaneously within the same RF. The result of these inter-
stimulus interactions is that representations of stimuli presented
simultaneously are weaker and coarser than those of stimuli pre-
sented alone. Even though these visual stimuli are represented by
different cells in both the retina and early levels of visual pro-
cessing, these representations are mutually modulatory, and thus
cannot be said to be “separable.”
What happens when we need the full detail of the visual stim-
ulus to guide behavior? Attention biases the competitive or nor-
malization process in favor of task-relevant material (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009), allowing that
information to dominate the neural response at the expense of
task-irrelevant material. Directing attention to one of multiple
stimuli therefore eliminates or reduces the suppressive influences
of nearby stimuli, consistent with the idea that selective atten-
tion biases the competition among multiple stimuli in favor of
the attended stimulus (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Luck et al.,
1997; Kastner et al., 1998; Reynolds et al., 1999; Recanzone and
Wurtz, 2000). For example, when a monkey directs attention
to one of two competing stimuli within a RF, the responses in
extrastriate areas V2, V4, and MT are similar to those evoked by
that stimulus presented alone (Reynolds et al., 1999; Recanzone
and Wurtz, 2000). Similarly, directing attention to one of four
neighboring stimuli pushes the extrastriate BOLD activity evoked
by simultaneously (potentially competing) stimuli closer to that
of the sequentially presented (non-competing) stimuli (Kastner
et al., 1998, 2001). These findings suggest that when attention
is directed to an item, its representation is protected from the
inhibitory influences of unattended stimuli.
Importantly, however, this protection breaks down when
attention is directed to multiple competing objects simultane-
ously. Our work has demonstrated that if attention is directed to
multiple items, competitive interactions among them impair their
representation. In other words, competition for representation
not only limits initial processing, but also our capacity to effec-
tively attend to multiple items (Scalf and Beck, 2010; Scalf et al.,
2011a). Consider the case when attention might be directed to
simultaneously enhance the representations of multiple compet-
ing stimuli. No single stimulus would receive a boost that would
enable it to dominate the competitive process; instead, signals
from cells whose RFs contained more than one attended item
would continue to reflect the contribution of all of the simul-
taneously attended items. Because attention would be unable
to reduce the inhibitory interactions among multiple attended
items, the representations of attended items would be weaker
than would be the case if a single item received attention. Our
previous research has confirmed this prediction (Scalf and Beck,
2010). The receptive field sizes of V4 cells in humans appear to be
between 4◦ and 6◦ (Kastner et al., 2001); when we asked partic-
ipants to view multiple adjacent items subtending 2◦, we found
that BOLD signal evoked in V4 by an attended item was weaker if
two neighboring items were also attended rather than ignored.
In fact, in another experiment we showed that simultaneously
attending to multiple stimuli produced no measurable effect on
competitive interactions among attended stimuli (Scalf et al.,
2011a). Although attention did enhance V4 BOLD response to the
stimulus items relative to when they were unattended, the com-
petitive interactions (assessed by the difference in activity evoked
by simultaneous and sequential presentations) were identical for
attended and unattended stimuli. Critically, the cost of attend-
ing to multiple items simultaneously was specific to conditions
in which the items might have required simultaneous represen-
tation by a common group of cells (Scalf and Beck, 2010). If
the items were presented either sequentially or in opposite visual
fields (and thus could be represented either at different times or by
different cell populations), then the V4 signal evoked by the cor-
tically isolated item was unaffected by the attentional status of its
neighbors. These data demonstrate that attention is less effective
at enhancing stimulus representations if it is directed to multiple
competing items, suggesting that competitive interactions among
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stimuli are one cause of humans’ limited attentional capacity.
Similar arguments can bemade regardingmultiple salient stimuli,
biased via bottom up mechanisms (West et al., 2010).
Although our fMRI data were the first to explicitly link lim-
ited attentional capacity to competition for representation (Scalf
and Beck, 2010), we were not the first to make such predictions.
Nearly two decades of behavioral research support the notion
that attentional capacity is functionally expanded when multi-
ply attended items are positioned such that they do not compete
for representation. Although not interpreted within the biased
competition framework, Sagi and Julez (1985) found that the
ability to identify simultaneously presented letters increases with
their increasing spatial separation, while Cohen and Ivry (1991)
reported that visual search displays containing identical number
of items were searched more efficiently when items were widely
spaced rather than clumped together. When asked to report two
cued letters within a circular 24-item backward masked array,
observers are increasingly less accurate as the spatial distance
between the cued items is decreased (Bahcall and Kowler, 1999).
Similarly, the speed with which observers can make judgments
about two cued stimuli (interspersed among fillers) is inversely
proportional to the distance between those stimuli; the greater the
separation between the attended stimuli, the faster participants
are able to respond to them (McCarley et al., 2004, 2007; Mounts
and Gavett, 2004; Hilimire et al., 2010). McCarley, Mounts and
colleagues explicitly propose that these findings result from the
failure of visual cortex to represent multiple attended items that
are positioned in a way to compete for representation. Reddy
and VanRullen (2007) also appeal to competition in visual cor-
tex to explain why search performance in facial discrimination
task improves as the spacing between items increases. The number
of moving objects that may be tracked (Alvarez and Franconeri,
2007; Shim et al., 2008; Franconeri et al., 2010) and the num-
ber of locations that may be simultaneously monitored for target
information (Kristjánsson and Nakayama, 2002; Franconeri et al.,
2007) also increases with increasing interstimulus distance, and
these data have also recently been interpreted as reflecting com-
petition for representation (Franconeri et al., 2013). Finally, a
number of studies have demonstrated that dividing information
between the two cerebral hemispheres, or isolating it anatomically
from each other in other ways, functionally expands attentional
capacity (Luck et al., 1989; Chelazzi et al., 2001; Alvarez and
Cavanagh, 2005; Delvenne, 2005; Carlson et al., 2007; Scalf et al.,
2007; Torralbo and Beck, 2008; Scalf and Beck, 2010; Alvarez et al.,
2012). These behavioral findings are broadly consistent with the
notion that attentional “capacity” is functionally limited when
items are positioned such that their representations will evoke
mutually inhibitory interactions.
Although separation in extrastriate cortex appears to expand
capacity, we are not arguing that competitive interactions in
extrastriate cortex are the sole source of our limited capac-
ity. Certainly, other limitations exist (e.g., Mecklinger et al.,
2003; VanRullen and Koch, 2003; Todd and Marois, 2004; Dux
et al., 2006) We suggest, however, that the interactive (com-
petitive) nature of neural representations across even seemingly
distinct neural systems may determine the extent to which the
information processed by those systems ultimately influences
behavior. Although direct evidence of truly competitive interac-
tions between inputs processed by separate neural subsystems is
sparse, this framework has been successfully applied to a num-
ber of data sets. Neural patterns of activation that are unique
to either face or house stimuli despite being anatomically sepa-
rated, actively suppress one another; this suppression is resolved
in favor of the stimulus class to which attention is directed (Reddy
et al., 2009). The capacity of visual short term working mem-
ory (VSTM) is increased if the to-be encoded items are presented
sequentially rather than simultaneously; these changes most likely
reflect the improved perceptual representations and decreased
attentional demands of the non-competing sequential conditions
(Shapiro and Miller, 2011). Neural populations that are respon-
sive to different stimulus modalities (visual, auditory, and tactile)
also seem to interact such that visual stimuli dominate response
processes unless very specific procedures are used to compensate
for the asymmetric excitatory connections between non-visual
and visual modalities (for a review see Spence et al., 2012).
Decision making and action planning have also been posited to
be represented by separate neurons that ultimately compete in a
winner-take-all manner to drive a motor response (Cisek, 2006,
2007, 2012). Finally, even the “separable” neural populations of
the cerebral hemispheres continuously modulate one another to
bias behavior in favor of one representation or another; disrup-
tion of these interactions are likely responsible for the effects of
neglect and extinction that may follow damage to the parietal
lobes (e.g., Rafal et al., 2006; Bays et al., 2011; De Haan et al.,
2012). In summary, no matter how great the apparent separation
between the neural populations that support behavior, their per-
formance and responses are always informed and modulated by
one another. As such, they cannot provide “independent atten-
tional resources” because their activity is in fact always interde-
pendent. We suggest that to the extent that this interdependence
is competitive, these interactions will also serve to limit capacity.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PERCEPTUAL LOAD AND DILUTION
THEORIES
Our conception of limited resources as competition for represen-
tation in the brain has implications for both perceptual load and
dilution theories of attention. Both theories purport to explain
when and why task-irrelevant information, or so-called distrac-
tors are processed. The basic phenomenon that both theories
endeavor to explain is the fact that under some task conditions
the to-be-ignored items continue to influence behavior, suggest-
ing that they were not actually ignored, whereas under other
task conditions the to-be-ignored items appear to be successfully
suppressed. Both theories explain the presence or absence of dis-
tractor processing by relying heavily on the concept of a limited
resource, although they differ in how these resource limitations
subsequently affect distractor processing.
Perceptual load theory (Lavie and Tsal, 1994; Lavie, 1995, 2005,
2006, 2010; Lavie et al., 2004) was the first to unify these con-
trasting results under a single framework. Lavie proposed that
it is the perceptual load of the relevant task that determines the
extent to which “task-irrelevant,” potentially distracting informa-
tion is processed. When the perceptual load of the task is low
(e.g., set size is small), spare attentional resources obligatorily
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spill over onto the to-be-ignored items and contribute to their
processing. Under high perceptual load (e.g., set size is large),
however, attentional resources are exhausted by the relevant task;
this leaves no spare capacity for the task-irrelevant items and
effectively excludes them from further processing.
Perceptual load theory has received a wealth of behavioral and
neural support since its introduction (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Rees et al.,
1997; Lavie et al., 2004; Beck and Lavie, 2005; Bahrami et al.,
2007; Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007; Forster and Lavie, 2008;
Macdonald and Lavie, 2008; Remington et al., 2012). The most
well-known evidence in favor of the theory, and the evidence that
dilution theory takes issue with, comes from the response compe-
tition paradigm. In this paradigm participants search for a target
letter and determine its identity (e.g., does the task-relevant dis-
play contain X or N?). Critically, in addition to the task-relevant
set (i.e., those elements which can potentially be targets), there
is a distractor letter that is compatible or incompatible with the
target letter (i.e., it either matches or does not match the tar-
get). Participants are explicitly instructed to ignore this distractor.
Nevertheless, its compatibility with the target can influence reac-
tion times (RTs) to the target, indicating that the distractor’s
identity was processed. In keeping with perceptual load theory,
this influence of the to-be-ignored item is greater in low per-
ceptual load than high perceptual load conditions. In short, the
distractor is more fully processed under conditions in which
capacity is said to spill over onto the other items in the display.
Dilution theory (Benoni and Tsal, 2010, 2012; Tsal and Benoni,
2010; Wilson et al., 2011), on the other hand, posits that the crit-
ical difference between the high and low load displays is not the
difficulty of the attentional task per se but the presence of multi-
ple heterogeneous stimuli in the high load displays that “dilute”
the effect of the distractor. Thus, the reason distractors impact
behavior less in high load than in low load conditions is that
there are more stimuli competing with the distractor in the high
load displays, leaving the distractor a smaller share of the lim-
ited processing capacity. Tsal and Benoni (Benoni and Tsal, 2010;
Tsal and Benoni, 2010) garner support for their theory by con-
structing what they call “high dilution/low load” displays; that
is, the displays contain many competing letters (high dilution),
but the target is made easier to find by virtue of its color or posi-
tion, such that it qualifies as low load (i.e., detected quickly and
accurately). Importantly, despite these displays being “low load”
the distractor effects are virtually non-existent; that is, the RTs to
targets are comparable regardless of their compatibility with the
distractor letter. Tsal and Benoni take this as evidence that dilu-
tion rather than load is responsible for the diminished distractor
effects.
We propose a third, alternative explanation of the classic per-
ceptual load effect, illustrated graphically in Figure 1 that stems
from our formulation of limited resources as competition for
neural representation but also shares aspects with both perceptual
load and dilution theory (Torralbo and Beck, 2008). As detailed
above, all display items compete for representation in visual cor-
tex, and presumably beyond. It consequently follows that high
load displays, manipulated via set size, evoke greater competition
than low load displays of a smaller set size; that is, rather than
being processed independently, multiple nearby stimuli mutually
FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of the consequences of competition
and top–down bias. Under high load, competition impairs target
representation (top panel) and thus a top–down bias is necessary to
resolve the target (bottom), which in turn filters out the distractor. Under
low load, the target representation is already clear (top panel) and thus no
bias is needed to perform the task (bottom panel).
inhibit one another leading to a poorer representation of all stim-
uli. Low load displays, in contrast, are those that produce less
competition among stimuli. This can be achieved with either
a smaller set size (which contains fewer competing items) or
homogenous non-targets that are distinct from and thus com-
pete less with the target (e.g., pop-out displays; Lavie and Cox,
1997; Beck and Kastner, 2005). Importantly, because the greater
competition evoked by high load displays impedes the represen-
tation of the target, a strong top-down bias is needed to support
its representation. This strong top-down bias then results in the
exclusion of the distractor and other non-target items. Under low
perceptual load, however, target representation is already clear
and top-down bias is unnecessary; in essence, this lack of top-
down bias leaves the attentional filter (or window) open, allowing
for greater distractor processing.
PERCEPTUAL LOAD AND DILUTION AS BIASED
COMPETITION
How does our view of perceptual load effects as a consequence
of competition and top-down bias map onto perceptual load and
dilution theories? Might our conception of the neural processes
underlying visual search and distractor effects help distinguish
between these two theories? We note that biased competition
theory has two components, and both are necessary to explain
distractor processing in our view of perceptual load: first, items in
a display compete for representation, and second, this competi-
tion is resolved in favor of the target (and away from other display
items) through a top-down bias.
The concept of dilution maps on well to that of competition.
Indeed, Tsal and Benoni (Benoni and Tsal, 2010; Tsal and Benoni,
2010) use similar “competition” language in describing the effects
of dilution: when additional letters are added to the high load or
high dilution displays “their features compete with those of the
incongruent distractor, degrade the quality of its visual represen-
tation, thus, substantially reducing the amount of lexical analysis
achieved by its corresponding lexical representation (Benoni and
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Tsal, 2010, p. 1293).” Note that here Tsal and Benoni are even talk-
ing about competition at a visual feature level, consistent with
known competition effects in visual cortex. The concepts of dilu-
tion and competition, however, are also compatible at later lexical
and semantic levels.
Tsal and Benoni’s description of the exact nature of the com-
petition differs from our own, however. In their view the target,
or potential targets, compete specifically with the distractor. In
our view, however, the spatial proximity of the potential targets
should result in their undergoing much greater competition than
occurs between the more widely separated target and distractor
(Kastner et al., 2001; Bles et al., 2006). Thus, although the task-
relevant display elements may compete with and diminish the
representation of the distractor at some level, we argue there is an
even more important consequence of visual competition (or dilu-
tion); specifically, the target representation may be so impaired by
nearby non-targets (as distinct from the response compatible or
incompatible distractor) that it is no longer identifiable without
selective attention. Thus, accurate identification of the target (as
required by the task) requires selective attention (in the form of a
top-down bias); without it, the target cannot be resolved within
the visual system. According to our view, this concept of a top-
down bias is both critical to explaining distractor processing and
most clearly distinguishes perceptual load theory from dilution
theory.
THE ROLE OF A TOP-DOWN BIAS
According to our biased competition view of distractor pro-
cessing, a top-down bias is more directly responsible for the
diminished distractor processing in high-load conditions than the
competition among stimulus items. It is the application of this
bias in favor of the target that results in diminished representation
of the distractor. The top-down filter not only enhances the tar-
get but also suppresses other stimuli, including the distractor. The
notion that enhancement of the target necessarily results in sup-
pression of the other items in the display is fundamental to biased
competition theory (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) and divisive
inhibition more generally (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Because
neurons representing individual items have mutually inhibitory
connections, an increase in the firing rate of one results in a
decrease in the other.
As currently formulated, dilution theory proposes no role for
selection of task relevant material. It simply assumes a passive
dilution (or competition) among the stimuli. Under high load
or high dilution, the distractor receives few resources because its
representation is diluted (or weakened) by other items in the dis-
play. There is no mechanism to direct resources to task-relevant
stimuli; resources are simply depleted by virtue of being spread
among too many stimuli. On the other hand, the concept of a
directed resource is central to perceptual load theory. According
to Lavie, high perceptual load tasks “engage full capacity” leaving
“no capacity” for task-irrelevant material, whereas low perceptual
load tasks fail to exhaust capacity leaving “spare capacity” that
“spills over” onto task-irrelevant material (Lavie, 2010, p. 143).
In other words, the distinction between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant material is critical in determining the extent to which
distractors are processed, because this distinction determines the
extent to which task-relevant material fully engages a limited pro-
cessing capacity. This is very similar to our concept of a bias.
For us, competition is biased in favor of task-relevant mate-
rial; ultimately the target item. As in perceptual load theory, this
enhancement of task-relevant material occurs at the cost of task-
irrelevant material. Unlike perceptual load theory, however, the
cost is incurred due to the competitive interactions among ele-
ments in the display rather than a depletion of some unspecified
“capacity.” We note also that, for us, these competitive inter-
actions occur in visual cortex; that is, the enhancement of the
target in visual cortex, by virtue of the inhibitory interactions
there, results in a suppression of the other stimuli including the
distractor. Perceptual load theory, in contrast, appears to place
the source of this capacity, and thus its depletion, in frontopari-
etal cortex (Lavie and Robertson, 2001; Kelley and Lavie, 2010),
although it does acknowledge the interaction between frontopari-
etal and visual cortices (Remington et al., 2012). In our view,
localizing the ultimate source of the competition in visual cor-
tex is more in line with the characterization of this form of load as
perceptual. As we have already noted, other cognitive capacity lim-
itations, which may play a role in cognitive load (De Fockert et al.,
2001; Kelley and Lavie, 2010; Lavie, 2010; Carmel et al., 2012),
may result from here-to-now unknown competitive interactions
among frontoparietal mechanisms.
The need for a strong bias to process high load displays can
also explain why “high load” displays that are physically iden-
tical to low load displays (Lavie, 1995) can still produce little
distractor processing, a set of results that cannot be explained by
dilution theory. Such tasks manipulate perceptual load by vary-
ing task requirements rather than changing stimuli. For instance,
participants are required to detect a conjunction target rather
than a target defined by a single feature (Lavie, 1995; Handy and
Mangun, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2005; Parks et al., 2011). These
conditions require a top-down bias to bind the features together
in a conjunction task (Duncan et al., 1997), again resulting in
a suppression of the non-targets. In other words, a conjunction
search requires a focused selection of the target whereas in feature
search the target can be located without engaging a filter, or by
leaving the attentional window open.
What is the evidence, first that a bias exists and, second that
it enhances the target items at the expense of the task-irrelevant
information? There is a large body of evidence showing that when
the perceptual load of a task increases it engages frontoparietal
mechanisms more strongly (Culham et al., 2001; Pinsk et al.,
2004; Schwartz et al., 2005; Scalf and Beck, 2010; Shim et al., 2010;
Gillebert et al., 2012; Ohta et al., 2012). Moreover, as proposed by
load theory, the fact that a concurrent cognitive task (i.e., higher
cognitive load) increases distractor processing presumably reflects
the fact that both the selection mechanisms and the concurrent
cognitive task draw on the same frontoparietal mechanisms (De
Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie et al., 2004; Lavie, 2005, 2010). We add
that our view that high load displays require a top-down bias also
explains why increasing cognitive load not only increases distrac-
tor processing when the perceptual load of the display is low, as
proposed by load theory, but also when it is high (Lavie et al.,
2004). Top-down frontoparietal mechanisms would be needed
in low load to prevent the participant from responding to the
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well-processed distractor (Lavie, 2005, 2010), but they would also
be needed to resolve the target when the perceptual load is high.
Thus, any concurrent task that draws on the same frontoparietal
mechanisms would increase distractor processing in both cases.
Not only has frontoparietal activity been shown to increase
with load, increases in activity in posterior parietal cortex and
the frontal eye fields have also been shown to modulate activity
in visual cortex (Moore and Armstrong, 2003; Ruff et al., 2006,
2008; Thut et al., 2006; Scalf and Beck, 2010; Scalf et al., 2011a;
for review Noudoost et al., 2010). These data are all in keeping
with a biased competition model in which attentional control
regions in frontoparietal cortex bias activity in visual cortex in
favor of an attended stimulus (Desimone andDuncan, 1995; Beck
and Kastner, 2009). As already noted, the idea that enhancement
of a target occurs at the expense of other stimuli in the display
is fundamental to the principles of competitive interactions. If
one stimulus is “pushed up” by attention then, by virtue of their
competitive/inhibitory connections, other competing stimuli will
necessarily be “pulled down.” There are now also numerous neu-
roimaging studies that find such a push-pull relationship between
target and distractor (Somers et al., 1999; Pinsk et al., 2004;
Gazzaley et al., 2005; Pestilli and Carrasco, 2005; Hopf et al.,
2006). More importantly, the extent of this push-pull relationship
(i.e., the difference between activity evoked by task-relevant and
task-irrelevant stimuli) is modulated by the perceptual load of the
relevant task (Handy et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 2005; Parks et al.,
2011).
HOW TO DEFINE “LOW LOAD”
Why, according to our biased competition framework of distrac-
tor processing, do Tsal and Benoni’s “high dilution/low load”
displays produce such small distractor effects? Like Lavie, Tsal
and Benoni define low load tasks as those that are performed
quickly and accurately. According to a biased competition frame-
work, however, it is not the speed with which participants can
perform the task that is important, but whether or not a top-
down bias is needed to identify the target. The question then
becomes whether, under their various “low load” manipulations
(Benoni and Tsal, 2010, 2012; Tsal and Benoni, 2010), the rep-
resentation of the target is clear in visual cortex without further
enhancement by selective attention. We believe that if the repre-
sentation is clear, the attentional window is left open; no bias is
then needed to selectively enhance the target at the expense of
the distractors, allowing the distractor to be more fully processed.
Consistent with this view, Roper et al. (2013) recently showed that
the size of the flanker effect increased with increasing search effi-
ciency; that is, those targets that were most likely to be detected in
parallel (or with the least amount of serial search) were the most
affected by the compatibility of distractors.
We note that implicit in our view of load is the idea that the
application of the bias is effortful, and therefore will not occur if
the participant can quickly acquire the target without it. This, in
a sense, explains why processing of the distractor under low load
is, in Lavie’s language, obligatory (Lavie, 2005, 2010). Although
excluding the distractor may be optimal (i.e., applying a bias even
in low load displays), participants are unable or unwilling to do
so if the target can be acquired quickly without the bias; after all,
participants’ primary task is to simply report the target as quickly
and as accurately as possible.
What is unclear in Tsal and Benoni’s “high dilution/low load”
displays is whether or not their “low load” displays actually negate
the need for a top-down bias. If they do not, then in our view,
they are not “low load” displays. Only if the target is already
clearly represented in visual cortex without attention, and thus
requires no bias to be identified, would we predict a “low load”
processing mode; that is, an open attentional window with no fil-
ter. Determining whether Tsal and Benoni’s targets are resolved in
visual cortex without top-down attention requires knowing how
visual cortex responds to their displays under conditions in which
the participants’ attention is directed elsewhere. For example, we
have shown that competition is reduced in visual cortex when the
display contains a stimulus that differed in orientation and color
from an otherwise homogenous set of stimuli (Beck and Kastner,
2005). This reduction in competition for pop-out displays (rela-
tive to a fully heterogeneous stimulus display) was apparent even
in V1, and occurred despite the fact that the stimuli were task-
irrelevant and subjects were engaged in a demanding central letter
detection task. The very early effect of a pop-out stimulus is con-
sistent with single-cell recordings indicating that V1 is sensitive to
local feature contrast, specifically when the stimulus differs from
a homogenous surround (Knierim and Van Essen, 1992; Kastner
et al., 1997, 1999; Nothdurft et al., 1999).
Critically, however, Tsal and Benoni do not use homogenous
non-targets and thus our pop-out data do not apply; the pres-
ence of heterogeneous letters is what makes their displays high
dilution. Instead they use color or position to cue the participant
to the target, which speeds RTs and improves accuracy. Are such
manipulations sufficient to improve the clarity of the target with-
out attention though? Certainly these manipulations provide cues
to guide top-down attention. Participants can use color or rela-
tive position to find the target, but if the participants are “using”
this information, they may be doing so through a spatially specific
top-down bias. Consistent with the idea that subjects are apply-
ing a bias, RTs to find the target in the “high dilution/low load”
displays of Tsal and Benoni tend to be higher than in the classic
low load displays (Benoni and Tsal, 2010, 2012; Tsal and Benoni,
2010).
Of course, color information could, in theory, be used segre-
gate the target in a bottom-up manner. For instance, a unique
color might be sufficient to segregate the color singleton from the
other letters as early as V1 (Zipser et al., 1996; Li, 1999, 2002),
but the question is whether V1 represents the form of the letter
sufficiently to support its identification when that letter is sur-
rounded by other letters, even if those letters are of a different
color. In other words, it is one thing to say that color makes the
target salient in visual cortex, but it is another to say that its form
is then necessarily resolvable without attention. As far as we know,
this has not been directly assessed in visual cortex.
CONCLUSIONS
We propose a neurally plausible explanation of limited resources
in terms of competition for representation. This explanation has
consequences for perceptual load and dilution theories. In par-
ticular, our biased competition interpretation of the data shares
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concepts with both theories. The competition component of our
explanation is similar to the concept of dilution, the only dif-
ference being that the former proposes a specific mechanism for
limited capacity behavior whereas the latter relies on the notion of
a limited capacity resource. These concepts are easily reconciled,
however, if one simply considers competition for representa-
tion as the underlying cause of dilution. Our biased competition
explanation also shares an important feature with perceptual
load theory. Competition can be biased in favor of an item; we
argue that this is necessary in high load displays in order to
evoke a representation whose resolution is fine enough to support
its identification. Importantly then, like perceptual load theory,
biased competition theory predicts that “resources” are directed
toward the target at the expense of the non-targets and distractors.
Dilution theory, in contrast, provides no such distinction.
In short, because our biased competition framework incor-
porates aspects of both dilution and perceptual load, we see it
as a hybrid of both theories that incorporates known neural
mechanisms. We believe dilution occurs and is responsible in
part for the presence or absence of distractor processing. We also
believe, however, that this cannot be the full explanation of the
“perceptual load effect.” Instead, a mechanism for directing atten-
tion and filtering out task-irrelevant stimuli must also play a role
in distractor processing.
Finally, although our explanation shares similarities with both
perceptual load and dilution theories, we see it as an improve-
ment on both because it draws on known neural mechanisms
and provides a neurally plausible alternative to the concept of
a fixed capacity resource. Admittedly, the notion of a capacity
or resource provides an intuitive metaphor with considerable
predictive validity for explaining limited capacity behavior; it is
unlikely, however, to be accurate at a neural level. In our view,
the actual implementation of the “limited capacity” more likely
reflects the interplay of competition for representation and top-
down biases invoked to resolve the competition in favor of the
target.
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